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Abstract: Geographic mental maps have been called on numerous times in 
explaining foreign policy decisions. However, mental maps lack a serious 
conceptualising endeavour in order to be useful to scientific inquiry. Before 
we can use mental maps to understand and compare foreign policy making 
processes we must define mental maps and frame them in their wider 
intellectual context. In this paper we develop geographic mental maps as an 
analytical concept and assess their conceptual “goodness” so they can 
contribute to enriching the scope of the foreign policy analysis toolbox. 
 




* * * * * * 
 
INTRODUCING GEOGRAPHIC MENTAL MAPS IN FOREIGN POLICY 
ANALYSIS 
It   has   long   been   understood   that   the   way   individuals   perceive   their 
geographic environment is important to foreign policy decision-making and policy- 
making. Halford Mackinder, the pater familias of modern geopolitics, recognized 
almost a century ago that each era has its own particular geographic perspective: 
 
The  influence  of  geographical  conditions  upon  human  activities  has 
depended, however, not merely on the realities as we know them to be and to 
have been, but in even greater degree on what men imagined in regard to 
them. (Mackinder, 1996: 21) 
 
This view was perpetuated throughout numerous geographic treatises in 
the following decades. The perceptions of geographic configurations and 
geographic patterns of history assumed a heightened relevance for geographers 
in explaining the interaction between states: 
 
It   is   clear   that   although   each   individual,   each   generation,   and   each 
government develops its own particular view of the world, as a result of 
geographical location and historical tradition, there are a number of major 
perceptions which have persisted over long periods and exercised great 
influence upon strategic thinking and political behaviour. Sometimes it has 
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been   a   map   constructed   on   a   particular   projection   that   has   served 
generations of statesmen as the basis of political and military planning. 
Sometimes it has been a compelling theory of spatial relationships and 
historical causation that has moulded the viewpoint and action of political 
leaders. (Kirk, quoted in Sloan 1988: 15) 
 
Despite the continued clamour of the importance of the role of geographic 
cognition on policy-making throughout the 20th century, very little theoretical 
development and empirical evidence has been presented to endorse such claims. 
With  the  exception  of  a  few  ground-breaking  studies  treating  foreign  policy 
issues, the study of geographic cognition evolved along very different trajectories, 
leaving explanations of inter-state relations for others theorists to explain. It was 
only in the 1980s that a systematic effort to “operationalise” the concept of 
geographic mental maps1 in foreign policy analysis (FPA) was undertaken, 
beginning with Alan Henrikson’s (1980) essay The Geographical “Mental Maps” of 
American Foreign Policy Makers (see Criekmans, 2009; da Vinha, 2010; 
O´Loughlin and Grant, 1990). 
The last decades have tenuously furthered this line of investigation. 
Predictably, most of those who have adopted this approach have naturally been 
geographers. International Relations (IR) theorists have occasionally dallied with 
geographic mental maps but without contributing significantly to the theoretical 
development   of   the   concept.   While   some   studies   dedicated   to   geographic 
cognition have been published in recent years (see Akçali, 2010; Bilgin, 2004; 
Glassman, 2005; Latham, 2001; Le Rider, 2008; Scheffler, 2003; Walker, 2000), 
most  have  tended  to  focus  on  regional  perspectives.  Other  works,  while  more 
global  in  scope (see  Bialasiewicz et  al.,  2007;  Lewis and  Wigen,  1997;  Sloan, 
1988), have not focused directly on the way that geographic mental maps inform 
the decision-making processes, rather concentrating on the way geographic 
constructions justify foreign policy decisions. 
In  fact,  some  of  the  epistemological propositions stressed  by  the  earlier 
studies  on  mental  maps  have  come  under  criticism  from  critical  geopolitics. 
Klaus Dodds (1994) has questioned the geographic practice of representing the 
political world, specifically calling on critical and post-structuralist theories to 
point out that “‘geography’ (or ‘IR’) as a technology or an academic discipline is 
not simply about ‘geographing’ or ‘earth-writing’, i.e., a practice whereby 
geographers  simply  record  the  already  legible  surfaces  of  the  earth”  (Dodds, 
1994: 187). According to Dodds, discourses of geographic representations are 
frequently  central  to  the  legitimisation  of  foreign  policies  which  fix the 
boundaries between “Us” and “Others”. 
Critical geopolitics has thus focused on exploring how foreign policy 
professionals represent political space according to their position in the world2. 
This differs from previous research according to Dodds (1994: 197) who criticizes 
 
 
1   The term “cognitive maps” has also been applied to describe  geographic cognitive  constructions. 
However,  the  term  “mental  map”  will  be  used  in  this  research  proposal  in  order  to  avoid 
confusion with the concept of “cognitive map” as applied by Robert Axelrod (1976) and which 
refers   to   a   mathematical   model   of   a   person’s   belief   system,   illustrated   by   a   pictorial 
representation of the causal assertion of a person as a graph of points and arrows. 
2  However, more recent research labelled critical geopolitics has centred its attention on “geopolitical 
cultures” and their commonsensical expression in television, films, novels, and newspapers, as 
well  as  in  the  formal  education  system  and  the  customary  politics  of  ordinary  nationalism 
(Atkinson and Dodds, 2000). 
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Henrikson’s work on mental maps for having “little recognition that the observer 
might be implicated within these observations or that it might be reasonably 
problematic in assuming one could (re)present the activities of others”. 
Consequently, scholars committed to critical geopolitics have developed much of 
the work on geographic representations in foreign policy. Relying on discourse 
analysis and similar methods, the central assertion of critical geopolitics is “that 
geography is a social and historical discourse which is always bound up with 
questions of politics and ideology” (Ó Tuathail and Agnew, 1998: 79). More 
specifically: 
 
Fundamental to this process is the power of certain national security elites to 
represent the nature and defining dilemmas of international politics in 
particular  ways.  From  a  geographical  perspective  this  can  be  described  as 
their power to write international political space by constituting, defining and 
describing security, threats and perceived enemies in regularized ways. These 
representational practices of national security intellectuals generate particular 
“scripts” in international politics concerning places, people and issues. Such 
scripts then become part of the means by which hegemony (in the Gramscian 
sense) is exercised in the international system. (Ó Tuathail, 1992: 438) 
 
However, more recently, some research has re-turned to analysing the 
mental  maps  of  particular  decision-makers,  or  decision-making  groups, 
revealing  their  world-views  and  the  way  these  ultimately  affect  their  foreign 
policy decisions (Casey and Wright, 2008; 2011; Henrikson, 2008). It is precisely 
in this context that the current paper is framed. With its focus on the discourses 
and representations of geographic space, critical geopolitics undeniably treads 
common ground with the mental map research program. Both highlight the 
representational dimensions of geographic phenomena in foreign policy, 
emphasizing  the  subjective  and  plastic  nature  of  geographic  knowledge. 
However, rather than focus on the discursive practices that decision-makers 
employ to justify and legitimatise particular policies3, my interest is on how 
geographic  representations  influence  the  decision-making  process.  In  the  end, 
we are much more concerned with how a foreign policy decision was achieved 
than with the resulting policy. 
Consequently, several issues need to be addressed beforehand. Despite the 
various efforts to clarify and explain the conceptual framework underlying the 
geographic mental map research agenda, there still persists a good deal of 
theoretical bewilderment. The concept of geographic mental map has diverged 
considerably  in  its  definition  and  numerous  methodological  approaches  have 
been undertaken. A scholarly compromise has yet to be established. The mental 
map lacks a serious conceptualising effort. Accordingly, the geographic mental 
map, as an analytical concept, needs to be clarified in order to be useful to 
scientific inquiry. Furthermore, geographic mental maps must be distinguished 
from other cognitive approaches so that they are not understood as just another 
name for an already existing concept. 
 
 
3  It is worth stating that much of the work done under the rubric of critical geopolitics has lost some 
of this character. According to Dalby (2010: 281) the recent proliferation of scholarly research 
has  implied  that  “the  focus  on  critique,  deconstruction  and  strategic  discourses…  has  been 
diluted and stretched as the label `critical geopolitics´ has been applied to numerous matters of 
war, politics, culture, representation, identity, economy, resources, resistance, gender, 
development, fear, emotional geographies and related matters”. 
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In  the  following  pages  we  will  look  to  examine  some  of  these  issues.  To 
begin with, the geographic mental map will be defined as an analytical concept. 
This implies clarifying some of the conceptual misunderstandings which have 
accompanied   mental   maps   in   the   last   decades   and   make   it   difficult   to 
distinguish them from other similar concepts – e.g., “cognitive geopolitics” 
(Criekemans, 2009), “geopolitical codes” (Dijkink, 1998), “geopolitical images” 
(O’Loughlin and Grant, 1990), “geopolitical imaginary” (Latham, 2001), 
“geopolitical  imagination”  (Agnew,   2003),   “geopolitical  scripts”   (Ó   Tuathail, 
2002), “imaginative geographies” (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007), “metageographies” 
(Lewis and Wigen, 1997), and “role concept” (Maull, 2000). 
Subsequently, we will try to place mental maps in an appropriate research 
program. In accordance with its main attributes and characteristics, geographic 
mental  maps  will  be  framed  in  the  cognitive  research  agenda  for  they  share 
many of the fundamental postulations that permeate other cognitive approaches. 
Nevertheless, geographic mental maps have geography as their particular 
distinguishing quality. Accordingly, the third section of this paper analyses how 
the different geographic attributes distinguish mental maps from other analytical 
concepts. Finally, we will assess the “goodness” of the conceptualisation of the 
mental map developed throughout this paper. More precisely, we will evaluate if 
geographic mental maps possess the attributes identified by Gerring (1999) and 
which contribute to a high-quality concept. 
 
DEFINING GEOGRAPHIC MENTAL MAPS 
Despite Henrikson’s (1980) initial conceptualising effort, very little research 
has since been devoted to developing geographic mental maps as an analytical 
concept.  While  it  is  relatively  effortless  to  encounter  numerous  references  to 
mental maps throughout the foreign policy literature, they are rarely developed in 
any  theoretical  detail.  In  an  effort  to  broaden  its  range  of  application,  mental 
maps have become subject to an exercise of “conceptual stretching” which reveals 
no analytical precision whatsoever (see Sartori, 1970). As stated elsewhere, “the 
geographic ‘mental map’ is still used as a catch-all term with only very vague 
notions  of  its  conceptual  underpinnings”  (da  Vinha,  2010:  61).  While  I  am 
certainly not against some explanatory leeway, a concept which is too inclusive 
presents a serious predicament for scientific enquiry. As Moscovici (2000: 30) has 
hinted, “by attempting to include too much, one grasps little”. 
Concepts are fundamental elements for the development of the social 
sciences. Yet many scholarly endeavours have overlooked the need for proper 
conceptualisation and advanced to determining measurements and causal 
inferences (Goertz, 2005; Munck and Verkuilen, 2002). The search to uncover 
the  “what  is”  question  has  often  been  superseded  by  the  determination  to 
discover  the  “how  much”  character  of  a  phenomenon.  This,  however,  has  not 
aided in developing and promoting the research on mental maps in any way. We 
must  recall  that  we  can  never  measure  or  compare  anything  satisfactorily 
without first knowing exactly what it is we are measuring or comparing (Goertz, 
2005; Sartori, 1970). As a result, we should proceed to conceptualise geographic 
mental maps in a way which can comprise the following essential aspects of 
concept  formation  (Gerring,  1999):  1)  the  events  or  phenomena  to  be  defined 
(i.e., the extension, denotation, or definiendum); 2) the defining properties or 
attributes (i.e., intension, connotation, definiens, or definitions); and 3) a label 
encompassing the preceding two aspects. 
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This  does  not  imply  that  we  should  discard  previous  scholarly 
endeavours. On the contrary, much gratitude is due to those who have already 
contributed extensive scholarly labour in developing the mental map concept for 
application  to  international  politics,  in  particular  to  FPA.  For  instance,  the 
Sprout’s (Sprout and Sprout, 1957; 1960; 1965) work is undeniably a major 
contribution to the scholarship on mental maps. The Sprouts parted with the 
traditional realist perspective centred on the acceptance of the existence of “real 
world” to which decision-makers reacted. On the contrary, they proposed that 
“the   real   world   may   exist,   but   its   ‘true’   characteristics   are   unknown   or 
unknowable to the environed individuals” (Sprout and Sprout, 1965: 119). As a 
result of this shortcoming, the Sprouts argued that “what matters in the 
explanation of decisions and policies is how the actor imagined his environment 
to be” (Sprout and Sprout, 1960: 147). 
Though many of the Sprout’s theoretical propositions resonated with many 
IR  scholars  in  the  following  decades,  it  was  Henrikson’s  The  Geographical 
“Mental Maps” of American Foreign Policy Makers, published in 1980, that first 
applied the geographic mental map as a conceptual instrument for FPA. 
Acknowledging  that  traditional  political  science  has  long  been  ill-equipped  to 
deal with the geographic perceptions underlying foreign policy decisions, 
Henrikson  (1980)  contends  that  the  mental  map  allows  for  a  better 
comprehension of how individuals make sense of different spatial relationships. 
With the intention of providing a functional framework for analytical purposes, 
Henrikson expanded the conceptual knowledge of geographic mental maps, first 
by identifying the formational factors subjacent to mental maps – i.e., the maps 
cognitive base and a person’s world-view (or Weltanschauung) – and then by 
describing the appropriate methods for analysing an individual’s mental maps – 
the geographic mind and the geographic field. 
Borrowing from Downs and Stea’s (2005) earlier work, Henrikson (1980: 
498) defined geographic mental maps as “an ordered but continually adapting 
structure of the mind – alternatively conceivable as a process – by reference to 
which a person acquires, codes, stores, recalls, reorganizes, and applies, in 
thought or action, information about his or her large-scale geographical 
environment, in part or in its entirety”. In this sense mental maps are cognitive 
processes that structure geographic information in order for individuals to 
understand their environment, relate it to their prior experience, and make it 
susceptible to problem-solving activities. 
However, this is a rather limited definition since it reveals nothing about 
the function and utility of geographic mental maps as an instrument for FPA. As 
a result, we must advance our definition to encompass greater analytical 
convenience  More  precisely,  geographic  mental  maps,  are  useful  for  revealing 
“the awareness, images, information, impressions, and beliefs that individuals 
and  groups  have  about  the  elemental,  structural,  functional,  and  symbolic 
aspects of real and imagined physical, social, cultural, economic, and political 
environments” (Moore and Golledge, 1976: 5). In this sense, they “refer not only 
to information, with its implication of truth and validity, but also to admittedly 
subjective beliefs based on partial, incomplete, or intentionally misleading 
information”  (Moore  and  Golledge,  1976:  5).  Put  very  simply,  a  geographic 
mental map is a cognitive representation which encloses an individual or group’s 
beliefs about the geographic character of a particular place or places and their 
relationship to other places or spatial phenomena. 
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While clearly underdeveloped in terms of their structures and processes, 
geographic mental maps are commonly regarded as fundamental to foreign policy 
decision-making (Best, 2008; Casey, 2008; Casey and Wright, 2008; 2011; 
Henrikson, 1980; Latham, 2001; Sloan, 1988; Sprout and Sprout, 1965; Walker, 
2000). Even while recognizing that geographic mental maps are prone to numerous 
distortions, few authors would contest that “the decisions that lead to political 
action, however, are taken in the more amorphous, nuanced world of the mental 
map” (Henrikson, 1980: 497). Political decision-makers have to make decisions 
based on information and events that are generally outside their national or even 
regional contexts. Therefore, mental maps are “systems of orientation” which are 
used for guidance in foreign policy-making (Henrikson, 1980; 2002). 
To  make  sense  of  the  diversity  and  complexity  of  the  political  world, 
decision-makers rely on simplified representations or mental models (Barr et al., 
1992; George, 1969; Golledge and Stimson, 1997; Holsti, 1976; Sapienza, 1987). 
No one individual can encompass the complexity of the world in its entirety 
(Lowenthal,  1961).  Scientific  studies  have  established  that  individuals  and 
groups have cognitive spatial constructs which they use to simplify reality and 
aid  political  decision-making  (Golledge,  2002;  Henrikson,  1980;  Mark  et  al., 
1999). Consequently, “the beliefs that compromise these [mental] maps provide 
the individual with a more or less coherent way of organizing and making sense 
out of what would otherwise be a confusing array of signals picked up from the 
environment by his senses” (Holsti, 2006: 34). 
More   precisely,   decision-makers   act   with   regard   to   their   perceived 
geographic context, meaning “what matters in the explanation of decisions and 
policies  is  how  the  actor  imagined  his  environment  to  be,  not  how  it  actually 
was” (Sprout and Sprout, 1960: 147). Accordingly, different actors can respond 
differently  to  the  same  event  in  the  international  environment  (Bilgin,  2004; 
Gould and White, 1974; Jervis, 1976; Kiesler and Sproull, 1982). As a result, 
mental maps are essential to policy-making in the sense that they are a “critical 
component of  general spatial problem-solving activity” (Golledge and Stimson, 
1997: 239). By informing decision-makers about particular geographic contexts 
and relationships, mental maps contribute to the process of spatial choice 
inherent in foreign policy decision-making. 
 
LOCATING  GEOGRAPHIC  MENTAL  MAPS  IN  THE  COGNITIVE 
RESEARCH AGENDA 
According  to  the  aforementioned  conceptualisation,  geographic  mental 
maps should be framed within the cognitive research agenda in FPA. Recent 
decades have witnessed the development of a considerable amount of research 
applying a wide variety of concepts, theoretical foundations, subjects, and “data- 
making”  operations,  making  the  cognitive  approach  to  IR  an  eclectic  research 
field  (Holsti,  2006).  Nevertheless,  it  is  possible  to  identify  the  central 
postulations that permeate the cognitive research agenda in FPA. According to 
Tetlock and McGuire Jr. (1999) there are two key assumptions underlying the 
core of the cognitive research agenda: 
 
1) The international environment imposes heavy information-processing 
demands upon policymakers. It is very difficult to identify the best or utility- 
maximizing  solutions  to  most  foreign  policy  problems.  Policymakers  must 
deal with incomplete and unreliable information on the intentions and 
capabilities of other states. The range of response options is indeterminate. 
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The problem consequences of each option are shrouded in uncertainty. 
Policymakers must choose among options that vary on many, seemingly 
incommensurable value dimensions (e.g., economic interests, international 
prestige, domestic political advantages, human rights, even lives). Finally, to 
compound  the  difficulty  of  the  task,  policymakers  must  sometimes  work 
under intense stress and time pressure. 
 
2) Policymakers (like all human beings) are limited-capacity information 
processors who resort to simplifying strategies to deal with the complexity, 
uncertainty, and painful trade-offs with which the world confronts them. The 
foreign policy of a nation addresses itself, not the external world per se, but to 
the simplified image of the external world constructed in the mind of those 
who make policy decisions. Policymakers may behave “rationally” (attempt to 
maximize expected utility) but only within the context of their simplified 
subjective representations of reality. (Tetlock and McGuire Jr., 1999: 505-506) 
 
From these key assumptions the authors identify the cognitive research 
program’s central research objective as the understanding of the “cognitive 
strategies that policymakers rely upon to construct and maintain their simplified 
images of the environment” (Tetlock and McGuire Jr., 1999: 506). They further 
distinguish between two types of cognitive strategies in their effort to simplify the 
understanding of how the different cognitive dimensions involved foreign 
policymaking function. The first strategy corresponds to representational 
research, which relies on cognitive or knowledge structures that provide the 
framework for assimilating new informational inputs and choosing between the 
diverse  policy  options.  Above  all,  these  studies  look  to  explain  what 
policymakers think. This entails understanding their assumptions about 
themselves, other states, inter-state relationships, the goals and/or values 
underlying  foreign  policy,  and  the  types  of  policies  most  helpful  to  achieving 
those  goals  or  values.  Some  of  the  concepts  most  readily  applied  to  describe 
these cognitive structures are “operational codes”, “cognitive maps”, “images”, 
“schemas”, “stereotypes”, “scripts”, “frames”, and “prototypes”. 
The second strategy embodies process research, with its central focus on 
identifying   the   abstract   laws   of   cognitive   functioning   that   clarify   how 
policymakers think about issues. The bulk of this research looks to comprehend 
the rules or procedures that are subjacent to the policymaking decision process. 
Some of the most significant lines of research in the process strategy are on the 
fundamental  attribution  error,  extracting  lessons  from  history,  avoidance  of 
value trade-offs, the policy-freezing effects of commitment, and crisis decision- 
making. Accordingly, in all these cases “the cognitive miser image of the decision 
maker  serves  as  leitmotif:  policymakers  often  seem  unwilling  or  unable  to 
perform the demanding information-processing tasks required by normative 
models of judgment and choice” (Tetlock and McGuire Jr., 1999: 511). 
 
PLACING GEOGRAPHY IN THE MENTAL MAP CONCEPT 
Several colleagues have questioned us  about what’s so exceptional about 
“geographic” mental maps? To be more precise, we have often been interrogated as 
to whether including the word “geographic” is not just another meaningless 
terminological concoction which merely retitles an already existing concept? The 
common reservation is “what does the geographic mental map have to offer FPA 
that hasn’t already been accomplished using other analytical concepts such as the 
operational code, cognitive map, or schema theory”? While initially taken aback by 
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such  queries,  we  have  repeatedly  contested  that  the  change  of  terminology 
denotes in fact a genuine change of perspective – i.e., a geographic perspective. 
While the cognitive research agenda has witnessed the development of a 
wide assortment of models and methods of analysis and explanation, the 
geographic dimensions associated with cognition remain clearly lacking. When 
geography  is  emphasized  in  FPA  it  is  almost  always  acknowledged  as  an 
essentially spatial feature. Despite the fact that there has been a recent renewal 
of   interest   in   geography   within   IR,   the   discipline   has   yet   to   “develop   a 
sophisticated understanding of the term” (Flint et al., 2009: 827). Therefore, the 
themes of physical distance, contiguity, location, and the physical features of the 
terrain continue to prevail in the majority of the academic research. 
To be sure, as Henrikson (1980: 507) has noted, geography is rarely the 
decisive factor in determining international politics. But it would be imprudent to 
dismiss  geography  altogether,  for  IR  scholars  have  long  acknowledged  that 
decision-makers  act  with  regard  to  their  perceived  geographic  context,  i.e., 
psycho-milieu (Sprout and Sprout, 1960; see also Golledge and Stimson, 1997; 
Jervis, 1976; Moore and Golledge, 1976; Sloan, 1988). Nevertheless, geography’s 
spatial attributes have been the overriding concern for those researchers attentive 
to geographic variables in their studies. Of the numerous spatial attributes (or 
“spatial primitives”) identified by Golledge (1995), only a few have been of interest 
to IR scholars – i.e., location, distance, order, density, and dispersion. 
Several significant studies have recently been published that buttress this 
point  (Colaresi  et  al.,  2007;  Mearsheimer,  2007;  Starr,  2005;  Walt,  1985).  In 
fact,  distance  has  traditionally  been  the  dominant  geographic  attribute  for  IR 
and FPA (Henrikson, 2002). Geographic proximity has long been considered a 
highly relevant factor in international conflict. Several studies applying formal 
analytical models have determined that “there can be little doubt that the effect 
of  state-to-state contiguity on  the occurrence of  war  is  quite strong” (Bremer, 
1992: 327). When considering the main factors contributing to international 
threats,  Walt  (1985:  10)  has  reinforced  this  conviction  by  supporting  that 
“because  the  ability  to  project  power  declines  with  distance,  states  that  are 
nearby pose a greater threat than those that are far away”. 
There is  no  denying the  importance of  the  spatial attributes for  IR  and 
FPA, but the scope of geographic mental maps surpasses this narrow analytical 
dimension. They inevitably must focus on all the geographic dimensions. 
Ultimately,   this   implies   defining   the   object   of   geographic   research   –   an 
endeavour that has spurred controversy since the dawn of the discipline (Claval, 
2006). Though this task clearly exceeds the intentions of the current paper, a 
few considerations must be made in order to truly comprehend the scope of 
geographic mental maps and their value for FPA. 
Accordingly, we can only benefit from geographic knowledge when we 
approach geography from a holistic perspective. This implies that we cannot 
submit to partial perspectives in geography. If it is impossible to reach a 
consensual definition of geography, it is however possible to identify three core 
concepts which have permeated geographic thought throughout the ages – i.e., 
space, place, and environment (Massey, 1994; Matthews and Herbert, 2008). As 
pointed out above, the concept of geographic space has long been embraced by 
IR. Even the vastly multifaceted concept of environment has been gaining 
considerable terrain in IR and FPA, namely through the ecopolitics and critical 
geopolitics research agenda. 
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Yet  the  concept  of  place  has  not  been  central  to  IR  research.  Indeed, 
“place” is as disputed a concept as you can find in the social sciences. It is in the 
context  of  Human  Geography  that  the  concept  of  place  is  usually  attributed 
great significance, and for “many geographers, place and the difference between 
places are the stuff of Geography, the raw materials that gives the discipline its 
warrant” (Gregory et al., 2009: 539). Defining place is certainly no easy 
undertaking. Staeheli (1993) identifies five conceptualisations of place – 1) place 
as physical location or site; 2) place as a cultural and/or a social location; 3) 
place as context; 4) place as constructed over time; and 5) place as process. In 
the  first  approach,  place  is  featureless  point  of  reference  that  locates  one 
position  in  relation  to  another.  In  contrast,  place  held  as  cultural  or  social 
location suggests that the local cultural, social, economic, and political networks 
help shape people’s identities. In a similar fashion, place as context attributes 
identities to particular places and spaces, rather than people. As opposed to 
identity-in-place  (as  in  the  previous  conceptualisation),  the  contextual 
perspective favours identity-of-place. Another conceptualization further develops 
this  reasoning,  introducing  the  factor  of  time.  Accordingly,  in  this  perspective 
place is a dynamic concept which is subjected to the historic layering of human 
activity. Finally, when place is conceptualised as a social process it breaks with 
the prior perspectives of place as a product. As a result, the emphasis is on the 
process  of  social  construction  of  place,  namely  those  operating  at  different 
scales. Accordingly, place is perceived as “intricately binding locales with broad 
processes and with other locales” (Staeheli, 1993: 163). 
Despite the peculiarities inherent in each approach, the dominant feature 
underlying the different conceptualisations presented by Staeheli (1993) – with the 
exception of the first – is the unmistakable attribution of meaning to place. In each 
of these conceptualisations place is imbued with symbolic social significance. 
Ultimately, the use of place “provides a context for the formation of political 
identities and the identification of political interests” (Jones et al., 2004: 99). 
These  conceptualisations  do  not  deny  the  existence  and  value  of  the 
physical  landscape.  Rather,  they  imply  that  “a  landscape  has  no  meaningful 
shape and significance until it is accorded place and identity in the social and 
cognitive worlds of human experience” (Helms, 1988: 20). Moreover, the 
conception of place as a social process is particularly important for international 
politics and FPA. The allegedly fixed, unchanging nature of geography has been 
one of its main attractions for scholars subscribing to traditional geopolitical 
theories  (Gray,  1999;  Kaplan,  2009).  However,  due  to  its  social  structure,  we 
must recognize place’s fluid and volatile nature (Flint, 2005). Consequently, 
understanding the distinction between space and place is essential for grasping 
the true potential of geographic mental maps for international politics and FPA. 
 
Space is associated with abstractness, quantitative modeling (the spatial 
approach),  freedom,  movement,  formality,  and  impersonal  location;  while 
place is associated with familiarity, security, home, intimacy, historical 
tradition, social-cultural relations, context, and geo-sociological effects. 
(O´Loughlin, 2000: 133) 
 
In effect, by focusing exclusively on space we risk missing out on a great 
deal of information and knowledge that is useful for appreciating foreign policy. 
Most notably, human agency, with its emphasis on spontaneity and creativity, is 
side-tracked (Ley, 1996). Human agency is an essential element of geography. 
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Individuals socially construct and are socially fashioned by geography. As Flint 
(2006: 4) has suggested “Since places are unique they will produce a mosaic of 
experiences and understanding“. Form this perspective, our milieu contributes 
to our understanding of the world. However, the social construction of place is 
equally important to grasp. In other words, individuals actively contribute to the 
construction  of  place  by  providing  images  and  narratives  that  portray  and 
explain  them  and  their  relationships  to  other  places.  This  is  precisely  the 
strength of the traditional geopolitical theories. Flint (2006: 13) claims that 
“Geopolitics creates images: geopolitics, in theory, language, and practice, 
classifies swathes of territory and masses of people”. Therefore, geopolitical 
representations associate spatial attributes, such as geographic location and 
configuration, with the cultural attributes of a place. 
In fact, research on mental maps has demonstrated the predominance of 
the   human   dimension   in   geographic   knowledge.   For   instance,   studies   of 
students’  sketch  maps  of  the  world  have  revealed  that  a  “factor  common  to 
almost   all   maps,   [is]   the   predominance   of   human   over   physical   features” 
(Saarinen, 2005: 151). Likewise, Schulten (2001) has confirmed that various 
means of conveying geographic information, such as maps, atlases, and 
geographic journals, generally placed great emphasis on human traits. For 
example, late 19th century atlases combined physical and human aspects of 
geography creating distant, homogeneous, and underdeveloped places ripe for 
colonial modernization. In fact, the non-cartographic pages conveyed as much 
information as the maps, if not more: 
 
As a result we find an emphasis on “quantifiable” information such as 
industrial production, ethnic breakdown, and religious association. Though 
apparently  idiosyncratic,  the  information  generally  related  to  the  human 
rather than to the natural world. These atlases framed the world as a racial 
hierarchy by highlighting the unified relationship between race, climate, and 
“progress,” and in the process created an ethnographic world that functioned 
according  to  certain  laws.  (…)  As  a  result  of  cartographers’  treating  the 
nation as a product of both the physical environment and the racial 
constitution  of  its  inhabitants,  race  and  nation  –  sometimes  race  and 
continent – became conflated. (Schulten, 2001: 33) 
 
We need not look so far into the past to encounter such evocative 
representations.  Contemporary  society  is  replete  with  similar  examples. 
Skimming over the more than one thousand pages of the recently edited 
Encyclopedia of the Peoples of Asia and Oceania (West, 2009) we can encounter 
literally hundreds of “informative” and “enlightening” descriptions of the different 
“peoples” of the regions of Asia and Oceania. For example, we are informed that, 
while among the poorest citizens of the former USSR, the Tajikistanis “are 
peaceful,  but  prosperity  is  still  a  long  way  off  for  most”  (West,  2009:  770). 
Similarly, whilst the Aeta “are all small in stature, dark skinned, with curly dark 
hair and dark eyes”, resembling some African communities, recent genetic 
research has demonstrated that “they are as removed from African gene pools as 
the rest of the population of the Philippines” (West, 2009: 23). 
However, these sorts of representations are not restricted to encyclopaedic 
works.  On  the  contrary,  many  policy  oriented  texts  in  journals  of  reputable 
stature also develop similar reasonings. Consider, for instance, Robert Kaplan’s 
(2009) recent acknowledgment of the importance of geography for the future of 
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international politics. While admitting that ideas are important in foreign policy, 
they are nevertheless geographically determined: 
 
The wisdom of geographical determinism endures across the chasm of a 
century because it recognizes that the most profound struggles of humanity 
are   not   about   ideas   but   about   control   over   territory,   specifically   the 
heartland and rimlands of Eurasia. Of course, ideas matter, and they span 
geography. And yet there is a certain geographic logic to where certain ideas 
take hold. Communist Eastern Europe, Mongolia, China, and North Korea 
were  all  contiguous  to  the  great  land  power  of  the  Soviet  Union.  Classic 
fascism was a predominantly European affair. And liberalism nurtured its 
deepest  roots  in  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain,  essentially  island 
nations and sea powers both. Such determinism is easy to hate but hard to 
dismiss. (Kaplan, 2009: 100) 
 
This deterministic outlook allows Kaplan (2009: 101) to identify that the 
“Eurasia of vast urban areas, overlapping missile ranges, and sensational media 
will be one of constantly enraged crowds, fed by rumors transported at the speed of 
light from one Third World megalopolis to another”. The same logic underlies the 
prediction that “the plateau peoples of Turkey will dominate the Arabs in the 21st 
century because the Turks have water and the Arabs don’t” (Kaplan, 2009: 105). 
In sum, the object of geographic knowledge is quite vast. IR theories have not 
benefited from the full potential that geographic knowledge has to offer. By merely 
acknowledging the spatial attributes inherent to geography we fail to understand 
how  geography  actually  affects  decision-making,  particularly  with  regards  to 
foreign policy. More precisely, a geographic outlook implies we proceed to 
 
… study the specifics of the world, not just where Pyongyang is but what are 
its characteristics. “Characteristics” may include weather patterns, physical 
setting,  the  shape  of  the  city,  the  pattern  of  housing,  or  the  transport 
system. (…) Understanding a place requires analyzing how its uniqueness is 
produced through a combination of physical, social, economic, and political 
attributes – and how these attributes are partially a product of connections 
to other places, near and far. (Flint, 2006: 2). 
 
It is difficult to understand this disregard for place considering the territorial 
state is crucial to IR scholarship (Agnew, 1994; Flint et al., 2009). As cultural 
geographers  have  stressed  in  their  research  program,  identity  and  space  are 
usually coalesced into a unitary object. This is especially true when we consider 
nationalities which are “seen as both fixed object, passed from generation to 
generation, and as territorial where the space of the culture becomes imbued with 
ethnic or national ideas” (Crang, 1998: 162). The involuntary denial of this holistic 
perspective has led to discarding the geographic mental map as a useful analytical 
concept for understanding foreign policy decision-making. Nevertheless, we are 
certain that a better appreciation of how geographic factors influence our beliefs 
can aid in comprehending foreign policy decision-making. 
 
ASSESSING  THE  CONCEPTUAL  “GOODNESS”  OF  GEOGRAPHIC 
MENTAL MAPS 
We have argued that while concept formation is never an unproblematic 
enterprise, at minimum, an effort should be made to develop the geographic 
mental  map  as  rigorous  an  analytical  concept  as  possible.  How  to  properly 
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develop concepts has been open to debate for quite a long time (see Collier and 
Mahon Jr., 1993; Gerring, 1999; Goertz, 2005; Sartori, 1970). Nevertheless, 
Gerring (1999), though recognizing that there is no single “best” solution to this 
problem, identified a series of criteria which can help determine the “goodness” 
of a concept – i.e., familiarity, resonance, parsimony, coherence, differentiation, 
depth, theoretical utility, and field utility. Accordingly, we can evaluate the 
conceptualisation of the geographic mental map above in order to verify if it 
exhibits all the criteria of conceptual “goodness” presented by Gerring. 
The first criterion – i.e., familiarity – is one of the major strengths of mental 
maps for FPA. According to Gerring (1999: 368), “The degree to which a new 
definition  ‘makes  sense,’  or  is  intuitively  ‘clear,’  depends  critically  upon  the 
degree to which it conforms, or clashes, with established usage – within everyday 
language  and  within  a  specialized  language  community”.  The  use  of  mental 
maps as a metaphor for the cognitive representations of geographic space has 
been  widely  cited  (Golledge  and  Stimson,  1997).  In  fact,  mental  maps  hastily 
lead to thoughts of internal cartographic-like representations that individuals 
possess4. The frequency with which we encounter references to mental maps in 
the  scholarly  and  non-academic  literature  testifies  to  the  familiarity  of  the 
concept,  as  well  as  the  second  criterion  –  resonance.  The  simplicity  and 
common-sensical   quality   of   the   allegory   of   the   mental   map   is   precisely 
responsible for its generalised, though under-conceptualised, usage. 
The definition of mental maps presented above also guarantees parsimony. 
Considering that a concept “is an abbreviation” (Gerring, 1999: 371), by defining 
mental maps as a cognitive representation encompassing an individual or group’s 
beliefs about the geography of a particular place or places we have avoided 
saturating the  concept with  endless  attributes.  Also the  concept reveals 
coherence in that all of its attributes and characteristics “belong” to one another. 
In other words, none of the attributes of mental maps here defined are in 
contradiction with each other. Rather the core features are effortlessly identified 
and consistently associated: i.e., cognitive representations and geographic places. 
Especially important in this conceptualising effort is the process of 
differentiation. One of the major denunciations of the traditional application of 
mental maps in FPA is the difficulty in distinguishing them from other similar 
concepts. By defining them and highlighting their geographic quality we can 
differentiate between other related concepts, namely those associated with the 
cognitive research agenda. For example, while sharing many resemblances with 
operational codes, these centre on the philosophical and instrumental beliefs of 
decision-makers.  They  say  nothing  about  the  geographic  character  of  those 
beliefs. By focusing on the geographic representations underlying decision- 
makers beliefs we are able to examine and evaluate an entirely different set of 
variables  at  work  in  the  decision-making  process.  Accordingly,  a  good 
conceptual enterprise simultaneously identifies what a concept is as what it is 
not  (Gerring,  1999;  Sartori,  1970).  An  additional  criterion  –  depth  –  is  also 
achieved  with  the  above  conceptualisation.  While  depth  may  seem  in 
disagreement   with   parsimony,   Gerring   (1999:   379-380)   clarifies   that   it   is 
necessary   to   “group   instances   /characteristics   that   are   commonly   found 
together  so  that  we  can  use  a  concept’s  label  as  a  shorthand  for  those 
 
 
4   However,  the  mental  map  has  no  literal  correspondence  with  physical  maps,  for  we  do  not 
necessarily have map-like representations in our head. 
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instances/characteristics”.  Therefore,  by  acknowledging  the  notions  of 
geographic space and place we can offer greater analytical depth to mental maps 
without losing focus of our principal research objective. 
More  importantly,  by  conceptualising  geographic  mental  maps  we  give 
them a truly analytical value, for concepts are crucial to most theoretical 
undertakings.  As  Sartori  (1970:  64)  pointed  out,  concepts  “are  the  central 
elements of propositions, and – depending on how they are named – provide in 
and by themselves guidelines for interpretation and observation”. By delineating 
the conceptual underpinnings of mental maps we can then proceed to develop 
the theoretical framework necessary to explaining how geographic mental maps 
affect foreign policy decision-making. As noted above, we have witnessed 
considerable  causal  inference  regarding  the  role  of  geographic  variables  in 
foreign policy decision-making without establishing the theoretical propositions 
underlying  such  conclusions.  Until  this  conceptualisation  is  accomplished  we 
are walking an empirical tightrope without a net. 
The last criterion is field utility. Gerring (1999) has suggested that most 
conceptualisations  are  in  fact  reconceptualisations  and  that  their  redefinition 
has implications for adjacent concepts. As a result, “any change in the original 
definition  involves  changes  in  these  relationships”  (Gerring,  1999:  387). 
Achieving such a correspondence between meanings is a taunting feat. We feel 
however  that  the  initial  paucity  of  any  conceptualising  effort  of  geographic 
mental  maps  has  avoided  this  predicament.  Not  only  were  geographic  mental 
maps underdeveloped conceptually, but many of the concepts used in a 
synonymous fashion have also lacked clear conceptual development. 
Accordingly, we believe the conceptualising exercise provided in the 
preceding pages contributes to a superior understanding of geographic mental 
maps. Above all, we trust that the present conceptualisation allows for a better 
and more consistent application of mental maps in FPA. While there is certainly 
a great deal of scholarly debate and research to proceed with, we are certain that 
any such discussions and investigations must begin from a solid point of 
departure. In our view, this implies first and foremost clarifying the basic 
assumptions of what we are looking to study and understand. Without this, we 
share the risk long recognized by Sartori (1970: 1033) and which cautions to 
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